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INTRODUCING ASSET SECURITIZATION TO
INDONESIA: A METHOD IN MADNESS
ARSHAD A. AHMED*

During the waning summer months of 1997, a leading Southeast Asian capitalist felt comfortable announcing that "[t]he prospect of [asset-backed securities] is very big in Indonesia."' Six
months later this comfortable sentiment of optimism was no
more than a lingering dream almost forgotten.
Asian securitization, which had been touted as a solution
to the region's fund-raising problem, has proved to be easier said than done. When Southeast Asian currencies were
rocked several months ago, U.S. investment bankers threw
lavish junkets to preach the gospel of securitization. But
as the Asia crisis has snowballed, one deal after another has
had to be indefinitely postponed.2
The light at the end of the tunnel has turned out to be
an oncoming train: just as banks and corporations in Asia
thought they may be able to securitize away some of their
troubles, they have been hit by sharp downgrades in sovereign ratings, further drastic falls in currency values and
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1996,
Cornell University. Thanks are in order for my dear mother and father who
have supported me since the very beginning, helping me to remember who I
am, where I am from, and where I am going. Wabandu lillahirabbi'l 'alamin.
' Asian Bond Markets to Recover and Grow, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT
REP., Sept. 29, 1997, at 1 (quoting I Putu Gede Ary Suta, Chairman of Indonesia's Capital Market Supervisory Board).
2 Cecile Gutscher & Betty Liu, Many Hurdles Stand in Way ofAsian Securitized Deals, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1998, at A23.
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the possibility that one or more Asian countries will impose some form of exchange control.3
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the Jakarta Stock
Exchange was down nearly ninety percent between June 1997 and
June 1998.' The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, similarly had
lost over eighty-five percent of its value against the U.S. dollar
over this period of time.' The Indonesian economy faced severe
recession and the ruling party seemed incapable of quelling popular discontent. President Suharto, who had been in power since
1965, stepped down in the face of widespread demonstrations
against his regime. 6

' Asian ABS Head Back to the Drawing Board, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT
REP., Jan. 12, 1998, at 1.

4 See Prices & Trends, FAR E. ECON. REv., July 16, 1998, at 82.
s At the close of foreign exchange trading in New York on Friday, June 27,

1997, one U.S. dollar could be bought for 2431.50 Indonesian rupiah. See For-

eign Exchange, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1997, at C18. In comparison, at the close of
foreign exchange trading in New York one year later, on Tuesday, June 30,
1998, one U.S. dollar could be bought for a relatively staggering 15,150 rupiah.
See ForeignExchange, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at C21.
The rupiah's value is entwined with Indonesia's balance of payments.
Until the latter improves, fresh money won't come in, starving the
economy of much needed liquidity. Without that infusion, debtors
won't repay creditors. And if the debt crunch continues, markets will
bet, correctly, that the demand for hard currency will exceed supply.
The result: further weakening of the rupiah and more bad news ....
Salil Tripathi, Now, the HardPart,FARE. ECON. REV., Apr. 16, 1998, at 59.
6 The Indonesian "reformasi" movement picked up serious momentum in
April 1998, when students, particularly in Jakarta, demonstrated and called for
economic and political reforms. Having been reelected unopposed to a seventh
five-year term, President Suharto vowed to repress protests. By May 1998, student protests grew and began to demand the resignation of Suharto. Rioting
spreac to other major cities such as Medan, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. Student riots turned deadly when police shot six students to death. This
occasion catalyzed the reformasi movement from student-led protests to a popular uprising that culminated eventually with President Suharto's resignation.
See IndonesianStudent-Police Clashes Turn Fatal,WASH. POST, May 11, 1998, at

A14; Nicholas D. Kristof, Suharto, a King ofJava Past, Confronts Indonesia'sFuture, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at Al; Mark Landler, Indonesian Cqpital Engulfed by Rioting, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1998, at Al; Seth Mydans,Suharto, Besieged,Steps Down After 32-Year Rule in Indonesia,N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at
Al; Cindy Shiner, Muslim Leader Urges Suharto to Step Down, WASH. POST,
May 12, 1998, at A13; Cindy Shiner,Rioting Spreads in Indonesia,WASH. POST,
May 14, 1998, at Al; Student ProtestersSlain hy Indonesian Police,WASH. POST,
May 13, 1998, at Al.
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When asked what the protesters wanted, one replied "a complete economic, political and legal overhaul of Indonesian society."" In some sense, the new Indonesian law of asset securitization represents freshness on the financial and legal scene.
Although it was originally conceived to capitalize on Indonesia's
remarkable economic and financial growth, during the course of
the Asian financial crisis the new law of asset securitization was
seen as a potential panacea to help ailing banks and companies out
of trouble. Thus far, the new law has been a non-starter.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Securitization in its broadest sense subsumes three transaction
forms: first, substituting securities for loans; second, loan participations; and third, pooling This Comment focuses on the relatively more complicated technique, known as pooling, wherein
the pool holds cash-flow-generating instruments and issues its
own securities. The pooling entity, known as the originator,
pools assets exhibiting similar characteristics, isolates them as a
matter of law, and sells interests in these orphaned pools to investors.9 Market intermediaries develop secondary markets for these
securities. Securitization is utilized to achieve two results.10 First,
it enables an entity to acquire access to funds at terms normally
reserved for an entity possessing an outstanding credit rating.
Second, it enables an entity to remove unproductive assets from
the balance sheet in order to improve both the debt/equity and
risk/asset ratio. This lets the entity enhance its balance sheet to
show improved financial stability.
The origin of securitization dates back to the 1970s." Securitization in its earliest days was propelled by the United States
government and involved the pooling and repackaging of residen7 Keith B. Richburg, Jakarta Protesters Angry, Organized, WASH. POST,
May 8, 1998, at A33.
See TAMAR FRANKEL, 1 SECURITIZATION 6 (1991).

See Stephen E. Dietz, CREDIT CARD SECURITIzATION 77 (PLI Com. L.
& Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 747, 1996) (providing guidelines for
banks involved in securitization activities).
1" See Calvin Reis-Roy, Securitisation Structures in the U.S., 13 J. INT'L
BANKING L. 19, 19 (1998).
" See Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth,
and Its Future Potential,in A PRIMER ON SECuRITIZATION 31 (Leon T. Kendall
& Michael J. Fishman, eds., 1996). The term securitization first appeared in a
"Heard on the Street" column of the Wall StreetJournalin 1977. Id.
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tial mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") that
could be traded on the capital market. 12 The securitization of certain assets, known as asset securitization, emerged later as a distinct transactional process.
1.1.

The Origin ofAsset Securitization

Asset securitization is the financial method by which an entity
sells its assets and derives a current windfall. The securitized instruments are known as asset-backed securities ("ABS"). The U.S.
ABS market grew as a result of the lessons and successes of the
MBS market. 13 In 1985, Sperry Computer issued the first assetbacked securities, which were backed by computer leases. 4 During the eight years from 1985 to 1993, originators offered U.S.
$428.2 billion worth of ABS on the U.S. capital market.15 Since
the advent of asset securitization in 1985, no ABS registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") have defaulted. 6 Public ABS constituted fifteen percent of all asset-based
debt from 1985 to 1993, as well as 7.6% of all public corporate
debt issues.1 7 As of mid-1997, the market for outstanding ABS in
the U.S. constituted at least U.S. $414 billion. 8 Most ABS assets
are credit card receivables and automobile loans, and to a lesser
extent, home equity loans, manufactured housing loans, trade receivables, and leases. 9 By 1996, about one-seventh of all outstanding automobile loans and one-fourth of all outstanding credit card
receivables in the U.S. had been securitized.
12 See FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 8.
13 See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

780 (4th ed. 1997). "Securitization in its present form was essentially created in
the 1970s as part of the U.S. Government efforts to encourage a secondary
market in mortgages." Claire A. Hill, Securitization:A Low-Cost Sweetener for
Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1065 (1996).
14 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 780.
See id.
See Mark H. Adelson, TRENDS IN SECURITIZATION: COMMENTARY
FROM A RATING AGENCY PERSPECTIVE 77 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course
15
16

Handbook Series No. 759, 1997) (presenting a series of case studies that show
what can go wrong underneath the surface of asset securitization transactions
and suggesting what investors should look for in evaluating these transactions).
17 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 780.
is See Adelson, supra note 16, at 80.
19 See id.; SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 781.
2 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization:A New Era in American Finance,in A
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, supra note 11, at 1.
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1.2.

DomesticatingAsset Securitization in Indonesia

Asset securitization has quickly jumped to the forefront of financing methods being discussed in Asia.2 Financiers in Asia increasingly view asset securitization as an untapped, viable financing tool that unlocks the door to rated-debt markets when the
asset-originating company is not necessarily rated.' Among the
debt markets of Southeast Asia, Indonesia's is the most well developed. 2' An early proponent of asset securitization in Indonesia
urged the government to securitize loans extended to small businesses and trade these securities on the capital market in order to
provide lower-cost financing to small businesses.2 4 The Indonesian government initially sought to promulgate laws concerning
domestic asset securitization in order to foster the development of
the Indonesian capital market as the premier debt market of
Southeast Asia.' The Asian financial crisis has caused Indonesian
authorities to rethink their original motivations for endorsing a
clear legal structure for domestic asset securitization. After the
Asian crisis set in, Indonesian authorities believed that domestic

2

See Paul F. Kruger &John Woodhall,Securitization in Asia, in ASIALAW,

SECURITIZATION IN ASIA 3 (1996).

2"See id.
23 Despite strong tremors of a currency crisis that caused market volatility
in Asia in late summer 1997, panelists at a World Bank seminar on the Emergence of Asia's Debt Market concluded that the region's local debt markets
would likely still become larger, more developed, and more standardized, notwithstanding the five to ten percent rise in interest rates between June and midSeptember, 1997. See Asian Bond Markets to Recover and Grow, supra note 1, at
1.
24 According to noted Indonesian economist Rizal Ramli,
[t]here is one thing we can do through the capital market to help small
industries. We can package the loans and securitize them. Then we
trade them on the capitaf market .... [T]here are still many small
businesses which need such financial facilities.... Their main problem
is not high interest rates, but the way in which they can access the financial system to expand their businesses.
See Securitization Suggested to Help Small Businesses, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 8,
1996, availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo File.
25 See generally, The Man Managing the Money: Interview with Soedradad
Djiwandono, Governor of Bank Indonesia, the Central Bank of Indonesia,
PROJECT & TRADE FINANCE SUPPLEMENT: INDONESIA (Oct. 1997) (hereinaf-

ter The Man Managing the Money) (discussing the efforts of the Indonesian central bank supervisor to navigate Indonesia's financial crisis).
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asset securitization would serve to jump-start their capital market
and help lift them out of their liquidity crisis.
Responsibility for promulgating regulations on domestic asset
securitization falls upon the Capital Market Supervisory Board, or
Badan Penggawas PasarModal ("BAPEPAM"). The Indonesian
capital market is governed by a body of law known as the Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tabun 1995 Tentang
PasarModal, or the Law Concerning the Capital Market, law No.
8 of 1995 ("UUPM").
1.3.

Introducingthe Five Decrees

The new laws concerning asset securitization and ABS trading
came into force on December 26, 1997, under the authority of
BAPEPAM, which oversees Indonesia's capital market.' Pursuant to the UUPM, the Chairman of BAPEPAM promulgated five
regulations in the form of decrees (keputusan).2 These five new
rules purport to cover many aspects of ABS including legal, tax,
accounting, and asset-quality rating. 29 The most contentious issue
involves the nature of the special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), known
under the new law as the Collective Investment Contract ("Kontrak Investasi Kolektif' or "KIK"). Any satisfactory Indonesian
legal framework must focus on providing clear and workable
rules for the SPV because prior to the enactment of the five deSee Govt Issues 15 New Stock Market Rulings, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 27,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo File.
2 See, e.g., Functions of Investment Managers Relating to Asset Backed Securities, Decision of the Chairman of the Capital Market Supervisory Board,
BAPEPAM Decision No. KEP-46/PM/1997, Dec. 26, 1997 [hereinafter
BAPEPAM- Investment Managers].
28 See BAPEPAM- Investment Managers, supra note 27; Functions of the
Custodian Banks Relating to Asset Backed Securities, BAPEPAM Decision No.
KEP-47/PM/1997, Dec. 26, 1997 [hereinafter BAPEPAM- Custodian Banks];
Registration Statement of Asset Backed Securities, BAPEPAM Decision No.
KEP-50/PM/1997, Dec. 26. 1997 [hereinafter BAPEPAM- Registration
Statement]. Model and Content Prospectuses in the Framework of a PublicOffering of Asset Backed Securities, BAPEPAM Decision No. KEP51/PM/1997, Dec. 26, 1997 [hereinafter BAPEPAM- Prospectuses], and Direction for the Collective Investment Contract of Asset Backed Securities,
BAPEPAM Decision No. KEP-53/PM/1997, Dec. 26, 1997 [hereinafter
BAPEPAM- Collective Investment Contract]. See also Marcelina Kumalasari,
Asset-Backed Securities TradingRegs in Indonesia, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK &
ECON. BULLETIN BD., Aug. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo
File.
29 See Kumalasari, supra note 28.
26
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crees, Indonesian law did not as a general rule endorse the prolonged existence of a wholly-owned, single purpose corporate en3
tity. 0
1.4.

Scope of This Comment

This Comment examines Indonesia's efforts to regulate asset
securitization. Section 2 canvasses the various motivations proffered by Indonesian officials for sanctioning the passage of a comprehensive law concerning asset securitization. Section 3 offers a
brief explanation of what constitutes a conventional securitization
transaction; this third section provides a quick primer that describes asset securitization, aiding the reader in placing Indonesian
asset securitization against the backdrop of U.S. securitization
norms.
Section 4 is the core of this Comment, and summarizes the vital features of the new law of asset securitization in Indonesia.
This Comment discusses the new law within the framework of
the extant securities laws that took force in Indonesia in 1996.
Section 4 examines the ways in which the new law of asset securitization will operate in practice and its most likely practical consequences. The method of Indonesian asset securitization is analyzed. The subtitle of this Comment describes the new law of
asset securitization in Indonesia as a "method in madness" for
several reasons.
Domestic asset securitization was unavailable in Indonesia
prior to the enactment of the new law. This is because the legal
structure to promote it did not exist under Indonesia's civil law
regime. Indonesian entities interested in asset securitization had
no choice but to take their transactions offshore. Therefore the
new law constitutes a new "method" for onshore asset securitization. This Comment deems it a method "in madness" first on the
ground that the new law a priori bespeaks uncertainty. The second reason this Comment deems the new law "a method in madness" is that the new law took effect during the height of the recent Asian financial crisis. Indonesian officials viewed the new
law of asset securitization during the earliest stages of rulemaking
See Benny S. Tabalujan, The New Indonesian Company Law, 17 U. PA. J.
1996; Devi M. Asmnarani,Bapepam to Allow Sale.of
Asset-Backed Securities Soon, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at 12; Interview with
Ahmad Fikri Assegaf, Partner at Lubis Ganie Surowidjojo (July 12, 1998) [here31

INT'L ECON. L. 883, 88

inafter July 12 Interview] (on file with author).
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before the Asian financial crisis as an engine for the growth of the
capital market; they felt that the new law's benefit would be to
retain domestic securitization transactions and attract foreign investors. In the course of the financial crisis, Indonesian officials
mistakenly viewed the new law as a prospective cure for their liquidity crunch.31 The third, and perhaps most important reason
this Comment calls the new law a "method in madness" is due to
the inadequacies of the five new regulations vis-a'-vis existing law:
this Comment argues that the new law does not fit neatly into the
existing scheme of Indonesian capital market law. The Indonesian
government failed in its attempt to weave optimally between its
existing civil law and its common law influences.
This Comment wraps up with Section 5, which offers some
conclusions concerning the new law of asset securitization, including how it fits into Indonesia's existing legal scheme and how the
new law reconciles with the original motivations for sanctioning
domestic asset securitization in Indonesia.
2. MOTIVATION FOR DOMESTICATING ASSET SECURITIZATION

IN INDONESIA
2.1.

Pre-CrisisMotivation

Before the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian
government sought to promulgate a law endorsing domestic asset
securitization primarily for two reasons: (1) to foster the development of Indonesia as a premier debt capital market of Southeast
Asia, 32 and (2) to bring home asset securitization transactions that
local firms had taken offshore.33 Given the increasing undertaking of securitization transactions in the global market, the Indonesian government saw the introduction of a new law concerning
asset securitization as necessary to achieve regional capital market
primacy.
See, e.g., Outlook '98/Asia Debt Markets: More Securitization Seen,
CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Dec. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Indo File.
" See The Man Managing the Money, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing the efforts of the Indonesian central bank supervisor to navigate Indonesia's financial
31

crisis).

" See BAPEPAM Wants Firms to Implement Asset Securitization Quickly,

INT'L SEC. REG. REP., June 19, 1997,available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo

File.
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Indonesia's debt market had been the most developed in
Southeast Asia34 when the international finance community
opined that Indonesia's debt market needed to become sounder
still.3" Indonesia, like the rest of the regional economies, needed
to develop benchmark yield curves, greater liquidity facilities (especially from domestic sources), standardized documentation,
transparent legal structures (particularly for bankruptcy),3 and a
settlement system in line with international standards. 7
BAPEPAM hoped that asset securitization in Indonesia would
"'improve the transparency of the financial market and transfer
liquidity risk from intermediaries to investors."' 38 Indonesian officials expected the presence of domestic ABS in Indonesia to increase public investor awareness of the debt capital market.' Indonesian authorities wanted to contour their capital market to fit
trends embraced in Western economies, such as the American
economy, where there had been a shift from traditional financial
institutions like banks toward institutional investment in large
pools with predictable cash flows, like money market funds.' Although securitization in American experience originally grew out
of the political desire to promote fixed-rate mortgages, private financial institutions grew interested in securitization for other reasons. Some proponents of securitization saw it as an ideal way to
remove assets from the books of the originator, thereby improving the capacity of banks to gain better control over the risk profile of their balance sheets.41
Three main factors influenced the evolution of the Indonesian
capital market: monetary policy, the role of foreign investors,

"4 See Asian Bond Markets to Recover and Grow, supra note 1. Southeast
Asia is now commonly synonymous with participants in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), whose membership includes Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Thailand.
s See id.
36 With respect to bankruptcy, seediscussion infra Section 4.3.4.
See Asian Bond Markets to Recover and Grow, supra note 1, at 1.
38 Asmarani, supra note 30, at 12 (quoting BAPEPAM Chairman I Putu
Gede Ary Suta).
31 See FourFirms to Launch ABS, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at 12.
40 Asmarani, supra note 30, at 12.
'

4' See JOHN K. THOMPSON, SECuRITISATIoN:

AN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 31 (1995) (analyzing the causes for the increased use of securitization and prospects for its further expansion internationally).
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and the degree of concentration of market participants.42 These
three factors have fallen by the wayside in the aftermath of the
Asian financial crisis of late 1997 and 1998.' 3 The motivations of
Indonesian officials to domesticize asset securitization evolved
during the term of the Asian financial crisis, from market development concerns to hopes that domestic securitization would
help the troubled banking and financial sectors." Unfortunately,
when the market crashed, so did investor interest in ABS.
Until the recent Asian financial crisis, Indonesian originators
and arrangers had been showing much interest in creating a domestic market for asset securitization. As early as June 1997,
BAPEPAM formally requested that relevant authorities identify
the short- and medium-term solutions available for domesticizing
asset securitization in order to eliminate the need for local firms
to venture offshore." Officials expected asset securitization to
benefit the Indonesian economy directly by retaining securitization transactions onshore and by generating new jobs and new
taxes.46 In order to regulate asset securitization and ABS trading,
and thus protect the investing public, BAPEPAM prepared five
new regulations under the authority granted it by the UUPM.4'

42

See DAVID C. COLE & BETTY F. SLADE, BUILDING A MODERN

FINANCIAL SYSTEM: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 160-65 (1996).

41 See generally Indonesia/ListShares: Moves to Shore Up BatteredMkt, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 26, 1997, available in WESTLAW, DJINSPLUS Da-

tabase [hereinafter Indonesia/ListShares] (describing in basic terms the plight of
the Indonesian capital market due to the Asian financial crisis).
44 See Govt Issues 15 New Stock Market Rulings, supra note 26.
4 "'Rather than their going to the Cayman Islands or to the U.S., it would
be better if we made a regulation on the securitization of assets, which could be
carried out in Indonesia,'" said BAPEPAM head I Putu Gede Ary Suta.
BAPEPAM Wants Firms to Implement Asset Securitization Quickly, supra note 33.
46 No doubt the Indonesian government would welcome the replacement
of poor bank lending by more efficient capital market programs such as asset
securitization. Borrowing directly from the market rather than from financial
intermediaries may help to dissolve certain lending practices that have had
negative effects upon the state-owned banking sector. Such practices include
memorandum lending and viewing bank loans as a form of development assistance that need not be repaid. See Michael S. Bennett, Banking Deregulation in
Indonesia, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 443, 447 (1995).
41 See generally BAPEPAM to Rule Security Trading, JAKARTA POST, July
24, 1997, at 11 (reporting on the comments of BAPEPAM Chairman, I Putu
Gede Ary Suta, in regard to ABS regulations being circulated).
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Post-CrisisMotivation

Well into the Asian financial crisis of late 1997 and 1998, Indonesia watchers anticipated the new law of asset securitization
and argued that one way to attract investors to Indonesia, and
thus create liquidity, would be to tap complex, structured financing such as asset securitization.48 Borrowers might also turn to asset securitization to help lift companies and banks out of their liquidity crisis.4 9 The Indonesian government hoped that the new
law of asset securitization would encourage the return of foreign
capital to the Jakarta Stock Exchange and provide an avenue by
which cash-strapped firms might recover from their shared liquidity crisis."0 The Indonesian Finance Minister argued that the endorsement of domestic asset securitization would allow companies longing for fresh funds to sell their non-liquid assets,
including future earnings, to investors looking for cheap deals.5"
Indonesian officials still wanted local firms to transfer onshore
their5 2offshore ABS activities in order to "enliven [their] market."
Although heavy issuance of ABS in the American historical
model followed times of financial crisis, Asian borrowers faced
extra difficulty in convincing investors to buy repacked localcurrency-denominated assets. 3 Credit rating agencies sharply
downgraded Indonesian ABS because the Indonesian currency,
the rupiah, had lost almost eighty percent of its pre-crisis value by
January 1998, which also led to a deteriorating macroeconomic
environment in which asset securitization transactions were operating. 4 The global market pushed Indonesian firms to do the opposite of what the government had wished: securitize offshore.
This is because only dollar-denominated receivables could pierce
the below-investment-grade rating slapped on Southeast Asian
See Outlook '98, supra note 31.
49 See id.
5' See Indonesia/ListShares, supra note 43.
5" See Govt Issues 15 New Stock Market Rulings, supra note 26.
52 Id.
" Gutscher & Liu, supra note 2, at 23 ("Since several Asian currencies have
lost almost half their values, few third parties have been willing to take on the
risk of further fluctuations between the Asian currencies and the U.S. dollar.").
48

5' DCR Downgrades Bank InternasionalIndonesia and P.T. BII Trust Certificates, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 28, 1998, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
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sovereigns."5 Nevertheless, some financiers saw opportunities in
Indonesia to craft securitization transactions because the process
was still the most palatable means of selling undesired debt off
firms' books, especially for banks.5 6 Indonesian officials had
turned to securitization to aid in halting "capital flight" and to
loosen the "liquidity squeeze.""7
3. PR-CIS OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
The international capital markets have embraced asset securitization as a low-cost financing tool. 8 Professionals at financial
institutions want to issue ABS in order to consolidate and sell off
receivables from loans, credit cards, or other financial assets.
Chief financial officers at subsidiaries of multinationals want to
consolidate pools of assets and repackage them into new securities
having their parent company's credit backing in order to take advantage of their parent's superior rating for their own lower cost
financing.5 9 In finance terms, securitization constitutes a type of
factoring."0 Factoring is the old process of raising money by selling rights to a future income stream. In an asset securitization,
the originating firm sells to a pooling entity its rights to receive
the future income from certain receivables. 1
" Of course, the currency meltdown is not bad news for everyone.
The deals that will prosper are those that can capture hard currencies
offshore, as not only will these income streams be free from the effects
of sovereign downgrades and possible exchange controls, they will be
worth much more in local currency terms. Indonesian exporters, for
example, have seen the local currency value of their dollar receivables
double in the last five days.
Asian ABS Head Back to the DrawingBoard,supra note 3, at 1.
56 See Tom Sullivan & Marc Hochstein, Asian Debt Woes Pique Interest of
U.S. Junk Bond Market, CAP. MARKETS REP., Jan. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Indo File.
" DCR DowngradesBank InternasionalIndonesiaand P.T BII Trust Certificates, supra note 54.
" See generally Marcia Myerberg, The Use of Securitization by Investors and
Issuers in InternationalMarkets, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 139 (Leon T.
Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996) (reviewing how a firm or agency pioneers in securitization in the international capital markets).
'9 "This means word is getting out among small and midsize companies
that they don't need a bank loan for capital when they can securitize anything
with reliable cash flow." Aaron Elstein, Merrill Explores Exotic Asset-Backeds,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 5, 1997, at 18.
6' Hill, supra note 13, at 1067.
61 See id.
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Securitization in its most basic terms is a process of pooling
and packaging individual assets such as receivables, converting the
package into securities, enhancing their credit rating to aid their
sale to third-party investors, and using proceeds of the issuance to
finance the carrying of the pooled assets.6 2 Asset securitization
ordinarily involves pooling smaller cash-flow generating instruments to reach a scale that makes their behavior predictable and,
therefore, ratable. Securitization entails in essence the use of information about the expected financial behavior of particular assets, divorced from any expectation of the financial behavior of
the originator of the assets. If you can predict the likelihood of
default and performance based on historical performance information about the pool, then you have the potential for securitization." As a species of structured finance, securitization is designed to separate the credit quality of the assets upon which the
financing is rooted from the credit and bankruptcy risks related to
an entity involved in the financing.65
From the market perspective, securitization has been defined
as "the substitution of more efficient public capital markets for
less efficient, higher cost, financial intermediaries in the funding
of debt instruments."66 Individual, segregated, and protected capital markets have broken down into one increasingly "global system where capital flows directly and in growing quantities from
one economy to another."6" As a result of this trend, firms are
looking for more efficient ways to raise capital, especially in the
form of debt financing." "In capital markets that are not segregated or protected from other competing markets, the more effiSee Kendall, supra note 20, at 1-2; Jason H.P. Kravitt, Introduction to
1-3 (Theodor Baums & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1996).
63 See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 1.
4 See Elstein, supra note 59, at 18 (quoting Carlos Valle, head of AssetBacked Sales at Merrill Lynch & Co.).
61 Securitization is based on "isolating a defined group of assets and creating
a structure for those assets that is legally separate from all-others for purposes of
bankruptcy and affords a financing option that is"less costly and more readily
availabre than standard financing." Bankruptcy Remote Entities in Structured
Financings, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 41, at 42.
66 See Kendall, supra note 20, at 2 (quoting John Reed, Chairman of thenCiticorp, now Citigroup).
67 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 21.
68 See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 1.
62
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cient forms will, by definition, replace the less efficient forms."69
Compared with more traditional debt alternatives, securitization
takes more documentation, more rating agency scrutiny, and
more legal and tax involvement on every issue.7' Even so, securitization offers many nonregulatory (efficiency) benefits, one of
the largest being reduction of information costs.71 This reduction
of information costs that is so vital to securitization is made possible by the intersection of market globalization with technological innovation."
Modern technology has propelled information as the key to
creating wealth and has encouraged the invention of computing
power, allowing for the manipulation of massive amounts of information.73 Because computers enable researchers to store and
retrieve extensive data about the historical performance of pools
of assets, financiers may now very accurately predict the behavior
of pools of such assets subsequently originated. 4 This development has fostered greater efficiency which has, in turn, catalyzed
a fundamental shift from credit markets to capital markets. Securitization is proceeding apace.
If an investor wants to take advantage of superior information
about the expected behavior of a pool of assets, then the investor
must be able to rely on those assets for payment without having
to worry about the financial performance of the related originator. Isolation of the pool of assets from the originator requires
the force of law and, as such, isolation is accompanied invariably
by the legal transfer of the assets from the originator to another
entity, often an SPV that has no businesses other than holding,
servicing, financing, and liquidating5 the assets so as to ensure the
independence of the pool of assets.'

69

See id. at 1-2.

70 See Dennis M. Cantwell, How Public CorporationsUse Securitization in

Meeting Financial Needs: The Case of Chrysler Financial Corporation, in A
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, supra note 11, at 55, 56.

See Hill, supra note 13, at 1065.
See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 2.
73 See, e.g., Cantwell, supra note 70, at 57.
' See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 1.
7

72

75 Id.
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3.1.

Reasons to Securitize

Securitization is brought to bear in the search for liquidity, as
a means to mitigate financing costs or mismatches between assets
and liabilities, and as a mechanism to manage balance sheets more
effectively.76 Firms securitize assets primarily in order to become
more liquid. Increased liquidity is reflected in a lower risk rating
and, thereby, relatively lower costs in the quest for cheaper capital. Securitization shifts assets or liabilities from intermediated financial markets, usually the dominion of commercial banks, to
capital markets. Capital markets are inherently broader, more
transparent, and increasingly standardized internationally,
thereby making the global market able to provide funds at a
lower cost than commercial banks that customize credit for borrowers who cannot tap the capital markets because of their small
size, peculiar needs, or lower credit rating.77
Securitization is popular because it lowers the cost of moving
funds from investors to users, such as borrowers, issuers, and
originators." On the user side, securitization encourages new entrants into the capital market, as well as price and product competition on the market, because it tends to increase the number of
specialized participants competing at various stages of the investing and lending process.79 On the investor side, securitization
contributes to the portfolio diversification by offering a product
formulated by converting non-rated, relatively illiquid assets into
rated, highly liquid, tradable securities at attractive market
prices." Benefits of asset securitization and ABS trading accrue to
a manifold of participants such as users (originators, borrowers,
issuers), investors, and securities firms who partake in the transaction fees.8 '

See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 770.
See id. at 768.
78 See Kendall, supra note 20, at 11.
71 See id. at 11-13.
80 See id. at 13. See generally Hill, supra note 13, at 1065 (providing an understanding of the securitization transaction structure and explaining the source
71
7

of a securitization transaction's benefits using a Modigliani and Miller capital
structure irrelevance framework); Steven L. Schwarcz, 7he Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) (explaining asset securitization

and showing how companies can use it to gain direct and indirect benefits).
See Kendall, supra note 20, at 13.
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Users are able to sell cash flow assets readily. Usually they incur a profit on the sale and receive income for servicing the asset
cash flows. Hence, users are able to make more efficient use of
capital. When asset cash flows constitute accounts such as credit
card or loan receivables, the account-debtor also benefits because
the originating corporation, i.e., the user, is able to offer lower interest rates due to its lower cost of funding.82 The originator encounters lower funding costs because any adverse conditions it
may experience do not affect those of the originator's ability to
service the receivables and usually do not affect the program's
cost; as such, this mitigates the impact on the originator's funding
costs of market volatility related to investor information and the
market's perception of an originator's financial condition."
Investors in ABS enjoy relatively higher yields on rated securities. Investors are able to partake in enhanced diversification.
For investors, ABS trading is another means of potential profitmaking. On the other hand, securities firms, credit and liquidity
enhancing commercial banks, and arrangers enjoy different benefits such as the benefit of new financial product lines. For these
financial intermediaries, asset securitization represents an increasingly steady flow of originations and fees, increased trading volume and profits, and potential for market expansion.
The originator gains a number of advantages should it engage
in the securitization of its cash-flow assets. First, the originator
may utilize asset securitization to reduce its cost of capital. 4 In a
cost of capital calculation, securitization serves to represent "the
quantification of risk and the maximization of an originator's asset base so as to obtain the lowest all-in cost of financing.""5 The
amount of capital needed to be held by an originator prior to securitization, in general, greatly exceeds what would be needed
against receivables after asset securitization. A second advantage
to the originator arises in asset/liability matching. Securitizations
supported by amortizing assets that pay principal to investors directly result in perfect asset/liability matching. Lastly, an originator benefits from minimal financial disclosure. The amount of in82

See generally Hill, supra note 13, at 1063 (elucidating, in abstract terms,

the various benefits accruing to securitization originators).
83 See INTERNATIONAL ASSET SECURITISATION 11-12 (oseph J. Norton et

al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Norton].
84 See id. at 12-13.
85 Id.
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formation an originator must disclose to regulators or rating
agencies is minimized because securitization focuses the investor's
credit analysis to the sustainability of the cash flow emanating
from the receivables themselves.86
3.2.

Elements of a Securitized FinancingTransaction

The asset-backed security is so named because each pool of
cash-flow assets is supported by specific collateral rather than by a
general obligation of the issuing corporationY Instead of purchasing a general obligation typical of corporate debt, investors in
purchasing ABS obtain a bundle of rights running to the underlying assets. The asset-backed security is structured under applicable laws to stand alone, and pass-through or pay-through timely
payment of interest and principal to investors. Securitization is a
financial method by which a portfolio of analogous or homogeneous credits generated by one or more originators is transferred
to an SPV that will raise the necessary funds for its acquisition in
the capital market through the issuance and placing of investment
securities backed mainly by the portfolio of transferred credits already described. Whereas the highest goal of any securitization
structure is to isolate the cash-flow assets from any risks associated
with the financial standing of the originator, the specific method
by which this is accomplished depends upon the peculiar nature
of the receivables to be securitized, the type of market access desired by and available to the originator, and any distinct regulatory issues which must be addressed.88
Investors in securitized receivables look for certain characteristics to reduce their risk. The first ideal trait of receivables is the
existence of a large pool of assets, because scale is what makes an

86

See id. at 13.

Practitioners tout securitization's ability to enable: (1)a low quality
firm to, in effect, issue high quality securities, and (2)cash flow streams
saleable only at sizeable discounts on lower priced financial markets to
be transformed into securities saleable at much smaller discounts on
higher priced capital markets. The claim, more generally, is that securitization is a method for packaging cash flow streams of receivables
for higher valued (and higher price uses, at a cost lower than the increment of value added.
Hill, supra note 13, at 1063 (footnotes omitted).
88

See Norton, supra note 83, at 8.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Int'lEcon. L.

[Vol 19:3

ABS issuance possible. 9 Ideally, a broad pool reflects the demographic or geographic diversity of account-debtors, 9 tempered by
a relative homogeneity of credit quality, maturity, and interest
rate profile. 9' The securitized assets should have low default rates
because high asset quality and small credit risk reduce the program's financing cost; not only should the default rate be consistently low, it should be predictable. 2 The cash-flow assets should
be insensitive to interest rate changes9' which are best reflected by
receivables representing products or services that have already
been delivered or performed. Optimal assets are those whose
credit quality is higher than the originator's own, and this is accomplished by credit enhancement such as guarantees or overcollateralization. Lastly, the securitized assets need to have limited prepayment risk because prepayment can reduce the interest
earned for the originator and SPV, and exposes them to reinvestment risk which may be damaging in a falling interest-rate economy.
Almost all of the structural complexities involved in securitization stem from the need to have complete isolation of the transferred assets from the financial behavior of their originator.94
This is why the centerpiece of an asset-securitization transaction is
the SPV. The SPV isolates the transferred assets from the originator because it is a distinct legal entity possessing bankruptcy remoteness. The legal form of the SPV was cultivated in the United
States and thus reflects U.S. law and practices. In the attempt to
transfer U.S. legal methods to a foreign jurisdiction with a different legal tradition such as Indonesia, it is axiomatic that inconsistencies and incompatibilities will arise.
The SPV was conceived in the ABS context solely to buy receivables from an originator, hold them, manage them, and issue
securities backed by their cash flow. Securities issued by the SPV
take the form of notes, trust certificates, or preferred stock, depending upon the form of the SPV.95 The SPV traditionally takes

89 See SCOTT & WELLONS,

supra note 13, at 771.

o See Norton, supra note 83, at 11.
9' See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 772.
92 See Norton, supra note 83, at 11.
93 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 771-72.
9' See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 2.
95 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 44.
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the form of a trust or a corporation. 96 The SPV in the form of a
trust is an Anglo-American legal invention. The trust form lets
an originator transfer legal title in certain assets to one or more
trustees who are obligated under the terms of the trust agreement
to use the cash flow from the assets for the benefit of one or more
beneficiaries.97 In the United States, the trust form of the SPV
arose from manipulation of laws initially designed to create trusts
for inheritance; case law eventually recognized the status of the
SPV. 98 In civil law countries that lack the trust concept, a separate
corporation is usually set up as the SPV. 99 The legal form of the
SPV affects what kind of securities it may issue and implicates its
tax status.
The three basic structures for the SPV are pass-through, paythrough, and collateralized debt." ° The investor's interest is equity-like in a pass-through structure. The investor buys a share or
participation representing an undivided pro rata interest in the
pool of assets and a right to a prorated share of cash flows generated therefrom. The pay-through SPV reflects a structure usually
involving debt. The investor in a pay-through SPV buys ABS
that reconfigure cash flows from the assets, often creating two or
more security classes such as senior notes and junior shares. The
asset-backed securities are tiered such that the junior grades buffer
the senior securities against prepayment and other fluctuations in
cash flow. When the pay-through SPV takes corporate form, it
becomes subject under U.S. law to corporate income tax, but the
interest it pays on the debt is deductible.1"' Collateralized debt is
of two kinds: collateralized loan obligations ("CLO") and collateralized bond obligations ("CBO").102 Collateralized debt involves cash-flow assets that remain on the originator's books, and
simply gives the investor the right to receive a stated interest and
principal generated by specific cash-flow assets. The CLO are es-

See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 773.
97 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 44.
96

98 See id.

99 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 773. An SPV may also be a
hybrid of a trust and a corporation.
1"0 See id. at 773-74; see also FRANKEL, supra note 8, at288.
101 See I.R.C. S 163 (West 1998).
102 See Elstein, supra note 59, at 18.
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sentially bank loans packaged into securities, whereas the CBO
are packages of junk bonds."
Investors fear the scenario wherein an originator's creditors
are able to claim assets that were supposed to be removed from
the originator's balance sheet."° Bankruptcy commonly gives rise
to a creditor lien on the receivables."' 5 Therefore, the SPV must
be shielded from becoming bankrupt and from the bankruptcy of
the originator or the account-debtors on the underlying assets.0 6
A "true sale" and "corporate separateness" of the SPV are vital to
protecting it from an originator's bankruptcy and allowing the
reclamation of assets transferred to the SPV on the basis of
fraud.0 " Legal criteria in determining what constitutes a true sale
differ among jurisdictions.0 8
The legal test for a true sale and consolidation can be guided
by accounting treatment of the ABS. 0 9 An important question
concerning the securitization of receivables is whether it qualifies
for off-balance-sheet treatment. Consolidation of the underlying
assets with the originator's may obviate treatment of the ABS, or
under certain circumstances the SPV, as independent from the
originator.' 0 Consolidation is usually deemed necessary if the
originator controls the SPV; however, the SPV can avoid consolidation by making certain that no originator has any equity in the
SPV."1 Essentially, securitization under any legal framework is
predicated upon the acknowledgment that the transfer of assets
from an originator to the SPV is a true sale rather than a financing.

See id.
...See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 772.
105 See generally JOHN O. HONNOLD ET AL., SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 392-444 (2d ed. 1992) (deliberating over security interests
in bankruptcy).
106 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 774.
103

107

Id.

101 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 44. For instance, in Germany, France,

Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, bankruptcy law requires a true
sale to have taken place before originator became legally insolvent or initiated
bankruptcy proceedings. SeeSCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 774.
109

See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 4-7.

110 See

S. Almond & C. Henderson, Accountingfor InternationalSecuritisation, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITISATION 151 (H. Morrissey ed., 1992).
"' See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 775.
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Investors disfavor contingencies that elevate the cost of a securitization, such as taxation of the cash flows as they run through
the originator and SPV before reaching the investor." 2 Investors
prefer ABS that obviate taxation. International asset securitization is amenable to tax forum shopping."' Tax considerations are
measured by whether a jurisdiction levies taxes on the transfer of
assets from the originator to the SPV, on cash flows of payments
by debtors into the SPV or of payment by the SPV to the investors, and on the profits earned by the SPV itself. 4 Another question is whether a certain country withholds tax on interest payments in general or in case the payments leave the country. A
securitization that contemplates cross-border payments may find
relief in a double taxation treaty between the affected countries.
In order to meet investor demand for investment-grade ABS,
the underlying assets must be treated with credit enhancement
and liquidity enhancement so that the securities earn a high credit
rating from a private rating agency."' Credit enhancement mitigates the effect of default by the account-debtors on the underlying assets by over-collateralization, spread accounts, or third-party
guarantees. 6 The same techniques are available for liquidity enhancement, which serves to reduce the risk that failure by the
servicer to transfer opportunely the account-debtor's payments to
the SPV will cause investors to go unpaid. Third parties who
provide credit enhancement and liquidity enhancement are usually rated as high, if not higher than, the SPV."7
Rating is a vital component of any asset securitization because
the technical detail of this financing transaction makes investors
want to look to professionals instead of undertaking their own
critical analysis."' Hence, rating agencies provide a quick, profesSee id. at 773.
113 See generally ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 62
(explaining and comparing the legal structures for asset securitization in various
12

European jurisdictions).

See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 45.
.15
See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 776.
116 See Schwarcz, supra note 80, at 136-38 @iscussing how companies entice
14

investors to purchase the SPV's ABS by maximizing their credit rating). See

generally Barbara A. Nunemaker, Credit Ratings on InternationalAsset-Backed
Securities, in ASSET SECURITIZATION 134 (oseph Jude Norton & Paul R.

Spelman eds., 1991) (discussing uses of credit ratings in international markets
and how the process of assigning a rating works for ABS).
117
18

See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 777.
See Kravitt, supra note 62, at 4-6.
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sional, reliable grade on the quality of the ABS at savings to a prospective investor. " 9 Rating agencies investigate five types of financial risk: account-debtors' credit risk, payment risks among
all parties, legal and tax risks for the receivables and securities,
performance risk of each party, and sovereign risk.12 Ratings
have a long tradition in the United States, but they are relatively
new to the global 121
market. The role they will have in Indonesia
seen.
be
to
remains
4. LAW CONCERNING ASSET SECURITIZATION IN INDONESIA

4.1.

The CapitalMarket of Indonesia

The capital market of Indonesia surfaced in its modern form
around December 1912, when Indonesia's first stock exchange
opened in Jakarta."2 Decades passed until August 1977 when the
Bursa Efek Jakarta, or Jakarta Stock Exchange ("JSE") resurfaced
in nearly its modern form. Within the last thirty years, the Indonesian financial system has experienced two periods of rapid development with an intervening decade of stagnation, a policyinduced slowdown in 1991-92, and a stagflation and liquidity crisis emerging in late 1997 (Indonesia's part in the Asian financial
crisis).1"
As of 1977, the JSE faced a new set of institutional reforms
launched under the auspices of President Suharto, which led eventually to the establishment of the Capital Market Supervisory
Board, BAPEPAM 24 Serious financial deregulation began in
1983 when bank interest rates and credit ceilings were freed. A
decline in oil revenue in the mid-1980s resulted in redoubled efforts to catalyze the capital market. After reform packages in
119

See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 13, at 778.

See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 9, at 209.
Rating of Indonesian ABS is a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Duff &Phelps
Rates Indonesia Credit CardNotes, REUTERS FIN. SERvS., Feb. 4, 1997, available
in LEXIS, Busfin Library, World File.
122 See THE ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE:
120

121

INDONESIA 1997-98, at 46 (1997).
123 See generally DAVID C. COLE & BETTY F. SLADE, BUILDING A
MODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 147-237 (1996)

(discussing the emergence of the Indonesian capital market).
124 For the complete story about Indonesia's financial system up until the
recent Asian financial crisis, see id.
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August 1985 and December 1987 set the stage, changes in tax procedures introduced in October 1988 finally caused the market to
awaken.1"
In the present day, the corpus of law known as the Law Concerning the Capital Market ("UUPM") governs the Indonesian
capital market. The UUPM was enacted in November 1995 and
took full effect on January 1, 1996.126 That same year saw the enactment of the Law Concerning the Limited Liability Company
("1995 Company Law," or "U=PT").
Indonesian authorities
sought to energize the growth of the financial market, establish
clear legal guidelines for market participants and protect investors
against harmful practices by promulgating the 1995 Company
Law at the same time as the UUPM 2' During December 1995
and January 1996, the government introduced a number of regulations permitting an increase in the foreign ownership of mutual
funds and securities firms, restricting speculative derivatives transactions and tightening the disclosure requirements governing the
corporate entities that issue bonds.'29
The Indonesian capital market is administered by the Ministry
of Finance and its watchdog administrative body, BAPEPAM.
BAPEPAM regulates issuers, buyers, sellers and underwriters of
securities and enforces the ULTPM. The UUPM is intended to
serve as the fundamental law concerning the capital market and it
establishes basic principles upon which operational regulations are
based. The hierarchy of implementing the UUPM begins at the
top with duly-promulgated laws, followed by ministerial decrees,

115 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 122, at 46.

126 The official text of the UUPM is published in the Lembaran Negara
(State Gazette) No. 64 of 1995 and its Elucidation is published in theTambahan

Lembaran Negara (Supplement to the State Gazette) No. 3608. For an English
translation of-the law and its Elucidation, see A Law of the Republic of Indonesia
Number 8 Year 1995 Concerning the Capital Market (visited Aug. 29, 1998),
< http://www.indoexchange.com/bagong/general/bapepam/bapepam.html >
(unofficial English translation published by the Capital Market Society, Jakarta
Indonesia).
12 UUPM Art. 116. See generally Tabalujan, supra note 30 (summarizing
the content of the 1995 Company Law).
12 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,

129 See

id.
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BAPEPAM rules and finally, rules of securities exchanges and
other self-regulatory institutions. 3
The operation of the UUPM calls for clarification and elaboration by way of implementing regulations (petunjuk pelaksanaan
or juklak) to be promulgated by BAPEPAM or the Ministry of
Finance.13 ' These implementing regulations may take the form of
governmental regulations (peraturanpemerintah), decrees (keputusan), other lower-level legislation or guidelines."3
Numerous
UUPM provisions UUPM specifically provide for additional
rules to be set forth later. Article 5 of the UUPM authorizes the
BAPEPAM to provide technical interpretations regarding the
UUPM and its implementing regulations.'33 BAPEPAM is
charged to encourage securities companies to undertake domestic
marketing programs. BAPEPAM does this by endorsing rules for
new financial products and services, as it did in the case of asset
securitization in Indonesia.
4.2.

Five BAPEPAM Decrees

Since 1996, Indonesia has experienced a domestic push to implement structural reforms which allow its legal system to sanction the institutions needed to make asset securitization a workable financial scheme onshore. 34 Although many Indonesian
banks and financial firms had floated their ABS offshore, Indonesian officials viewed asset securitization as a new and potentially
powerful financial instrument for both primary and secondary
domestic capital markets. 35 In June 1997, BAPEPAM acknowledged that it had made formal submissions to the relevant
authorities to identify the short and medium term solutions available to attract, cultivate, and retain asset securitization business;
the government wanted to find ways to stop Indonesian compa13' See Message of the Chairman of BAPEPAM (visited Aug. 29, 1998),
<.http://www.indoexchange.com/bagong/general/bapepam/bapepam.html >
(dated April 1996).
131 See generally Tabalujan, supra note 30, at 903 (discussing the general nature of implementing regulations under Indonesian law).
132 See id.
133

See, e.g., UUPM Art. 5.

See, e.g., SecuritizationSuggested to Help Small Businesses,JAKARTA POST,
Nov. 8, 1996.
...Electronic-Mail Interview with Ibrahim S. Assegaf, Attorney at HHP
Law Firm (Dec. 11, 1997) (on file with author).
134
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nies from going offshore to securitize their assets. 36 BAPEPAM
set up a product development committee and a contingency plan
committee to prepare the new regulations.137 The new law of asset securitization in Indonesia comprises five Decrees of the
Chairman of BAPEPAM.'38 These five decrees were stipulated on
December 26, 1997, and took immediate legal effect.'39
Under this new law, the method for domestic asset securitization in Indonesia begins with the originating entity. The Originator sells its specified assets to a corporate entity known as the Investment Manager." The proceeds of this sale of assets return to
the Originator. Substantive requirements about the Servicer do
not appear in the decree. Therefore, the new law is interpreted to
permit the Originator to be the Servicer of the assets. The Investment Manager may elect to obtain credit enhancement of the
underlying assets.
Although the Investment Manager buys the assets, it does not
hold them. The Custodian holds the assets under its name on behalf of the investors.'41 The legal relationship between the Investment Manager ("IM") and the Custodian is governed by the
Kontrak Investasi Kolektif ("KIK").'4 2 The KIK provides that the
IM will manage the portfolio on behalf of the investors and the
Custodian will hold the assets.' The responsibility of paying the
investors lies with the IM.'"

See BAPEPAM Want Firms to Implement Asset Securitization Quickly,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., June 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo
File.
137 See BAPEPAM to Rule Security Trading,supra note 47, at 11.
'3s The Decisions of the Chairman of the Capital Market Supervisory
Board ("BAPEPAM") are identified and elucidated infra notes 139-59.
139 These five decrees are officially available in the Indonesian language
only. Therefore, this Comment undertakes a rudimentary analysis of the
uniquely Indonesian method for asset securitization as endorsed in the new law.
Because this analysis is based upon an unofficial English rendering of the meaning of the five decrees, the reader should bear in mind that this Comment cannot be read for the purposes of analyzing the text of the five decrees.
140 See BAPEPAM- Investment Managers, supra note 27.
141 See Functions of the Custodian Banks Relating to Asset Backed Securities, BAPEPAM Decision No. KEP-47/PM/1997, Dec. 26, 1997 [hereinafter
BAPEPAM- Custodian Banks).
112 See BAPEPAM- Collective Investment Contract, supra note 28.
136

143 See id.
"

See BAPEPAM- Investment Managers, supra note 27.
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Function of the Investment Manager

Decree 46 requires the IM of the KIK to fulfill certain requirements. The IM must be a limited liability company having a
net working capital not less than twenty-five billion rupiahs, according to the first provision of this decree. 4 ' The provision further discusses the necessary qualifications of employees of the TM,
requires the IM not to be affiliated with the underlying creditors
of the Originator and marks a liquidity objective for domestic
trading of the ABS.'46 The second provision of this decree sets
forth certain fiduciary duty standards used to judge the IM. The
third provision specifies the information that the IM must report
to the ABS investors every month. The fourth provision requires
the IM to publish annual financial statements. The fifth provision
empowers the IM to oust the Custodian in a prescribed manner.
The sixth provision discusses the duty of the IM to represent the
interests of the investors as against those of the Custodian or any
Servicer. Finally, the seventh provision authorizes BAPEPAM to
replace the IM if the TM breaches its duties.
The IM has a dual role. It acts first as a trustee and second as
the SPV. Like the common law trustee and unlike the conventional SPV, the TM is not ostensibly bankruptcy remote. The rationale behind not requiring the IM to be bankruptcy remote is
that the IM does not hold the assets. Under the KIK, the function
of holding the assets lies with the Custodian. If the Custodian is
deemed to be bankrupt, assets held in its custody remain separate,
thereby providing a sort of bankruptcy remoteness. 47
4.2.2.

Functionof the Custodian

Decree 47 discusses the responsibilities of the Custodian. 48
The Custodian must be a bank that holds the underlying assets in
accordance with the requirements provided in the first provision
of this decree. 149 The first provision calls for the Custodian to re141 See id. Every corporate entity in Indonesia must be a limited liability
company, and every limited liability company is governed by the Law Concerning the Limited Liability Company. See Tabalujan, supra note 30 (providing a succinct and valuable summary of the 1995 Company Law).
146 See BAPEPAM- Investment Managers, supra note 27.
...See July 12 Interview, supra note 30.

"' See BAPEPAM- Custodian Banks, supra note 28.
149 See id.
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tain documentation concerning the ABS, to undertake depository
functions, to make all financial transfers as directed by the IM, to
keep lists of all investors, to report wrongdoing by the IM to
BAPEPAM and to execute tasks relating to the portfolios held
under the KIK. The second provision provides for the Custodian's compensation. The third provision requires the Custodian
to execute the orders given to it under the KIK from the IM. The
fourth provision informs the Custodian of the actions it should
take in case it receives an instruction from the IM that contravenes its responsibility to maintain the financial assets of the portfolio. Finally, the fifth provision empowers BAPEPAM or the
IM to replace the Custodian, seemingly at will.
The Custodian holds the assets under its name on behalf of the
investors in the ABS. Legally speaking, the assets do not "belong" to the Custodian. Therefore, the assets will survive the liquidation or bankruptcy of the Custodian bank; this is how the
KIK envisions bankruptcy remoteness."' The BAPEPAM decree
implies that the Custodian will be a registered bank.
4.2.3.

The RegistrationStatement

Decree 50 discusses the registration statement as regards the
public offering of ABS.151 The first provision of this decree spells
out what the IM must include in submitting the Registration
1 2
Statement to BAPEPAM.
The second provision directs
BAPEPAM to inform the IM about whether the Registration
Statement is satisfactory or how it is deficient. Attached to this
decree is Form No. IX.C.9-1 which the IM must fill out and submit to BAPEPAM. The Form takes information about the IM,
the Custodian, the Initial Creditor, the Accountant, the Legal
Consultant, the Notary, the Servicers, the Stock Administration
Bureau (if any), the Underwriter (if any), and the Rating Agency.
Essentially, this decree requires the IM to submit to BAPEPAM
all material facts about the issuance of ABS.
A second attachment to this Decree is Form No. IX.C.9-2
("the Form") which lets the Chairman of BAPEPAM request
supplemental information from the IM. Copies of the Form are
automatically sent to the Minister of Finance, Secretary General
See July 12 Interview, supra note 30.
See BAPEPAM- Registration Statement, supra note 28.
152 See id.
150

151
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of the Finance Ministry, Secretary of BAPEPAM, bureaus heads
at BAPEPAM, and the Board of Directors of the Custodian.
4.2.4.

The Prospectus

Decree 51 provides the model and content of a prospectus
published for an offering of ABS.1 1 3 The prospectus shall cover all
material facts and details of the securities being issued. 4 Materiality here refers to information capable of affecting the decision of
an investor, as known or should be known by the IM, unless not
otherwise required."' 5 The prospectus must be clear and communicative and it must contain adequate summaries in which facts
are provided in the order of their importance. This decree permits the use of visual evidence in a prospectus.
The first provision of this decree specifies what information
56
the prospectus must include about parties to the transaction."
The second provision calls for a list of contents. The third provision requires a brief description of the most important matters relating to the issuance of these particular securities. The fourth
provision specifies what information the prospectus must include
about the nature of the ABS being sold. The fifth and sixth provisions ask for the IM and Custodian to discuss their respective
backgrounds. The seventh provision asks for any insurance or
other guarantees that may exist. The eighth provision requires information about taxation. The ninth provision asks for the credit
rating of the securities. The tenth provision asks for legal opinions relating to the issuance. The eleventh provision refers to the
Stock Administration Bureau. The twelfth provision demands information about various risk factors such as liquidity and market
risk, exchange rate risk, credit risk, payment risk, operational
risk, and legal risk. The thirteenth provision requests information regarding any credit enhancement, which may exist. The
fourteenth provision provides for the rights of investors to obtain
periodic financial statements, tax information and payment on the
securities. Finally, the fifteenth provision discusses procedures
and requirements for the order of ABS.

15

See BAPEPAM- Prospectuses, supra note 28.

154 See id.
155

See id.

156 See id.
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The Collective Investment Contract

Decree 53 is the most important piece of the new law on asset
securitization. This regulation stipulates ihe basic provisions that
must be present in every KIK.57 The first provision of this decree
sets forth definitions. Subpart A provides that the KIK is an enforceable contract between the IM and the Custodian, which
binds the one holding or having an interest in the investment
unit, i.e., the investor, and wherein the IM is authorized to manage the KIK and the Custodian is authorized to organize the collective custody." 8 Subpart B provides that the asset-backed security constitutes the form of the investment unit, whose portfolio
comprises claims arising out of commercial paper, leases, conditional sales, installment sales, credit card receivables, housing receivables, debt stock secured by the government, credit-enhancement, and all financial assets related to the pool. Subpart B also
explicitly states that the ABS do not constitute securities of a mutual fund. Subpart C allows the ABS fixed cash flow to take the
form of securities that confer the right to their holders to have
payment on a fixed schedule, although the schedule may be
changed; this provision makes the ABS appear more debt-like
rather than equity-like. Subpart D allows the ABS floating cash
flow to take the form of securities that confer the right to their
holders to have payment in a floating amount. Subpart E explicates various methods of credit enhancement to increase the quality of the collective portfolio, i.e., the pool. Subpart F defines the
Originator as the party having transferred collectively the financial assets to the holders of the ABS. Subpart G defines the
Servicer as the responsible party in processing and supervising the
payment to be fulfilled by the underlying account-debtors; the
Servicer is responsible for warning account-debtors against default
and ensuring that underlying account claims are collected on time.
Finally, subpart H defines disclosure documentation as the written statements which accommodate the material information
made by the IM within the latest twelve months and are provided
to prospective investors before they invest.
Provisions two through ten of Decree 53 elucidate the nature
of the ABS as well as the KIK. 59 The second provision of this deSee BAPEPAM- Collective Investment Contract, supra note 28.
158 See id.
159 See id.
157
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cree lets the Originator replace the underlying assets by means of
a sale or swap with the KIK.160 The third provision requires a certified legal opinion ensuring that the rights of ABS holders are in
accordance with what is stated in the disclosure documentation.
The fourth provision requires the ABS holders to sign a statement
saying that they have read the documentation and accept the
terms of the KIK. The fifth provision provides for different
classes of ABS under the KIK, and provides for the determination
of conditions that may necessitate dilution or liquidation of the
KIK. At all times the IM has the primary duty to manage the
KIK portfolio on behalf of the ABS holders, just as a trustee has a
duty to manage the trust.161 The sixth provision directs the KIK
to disclose the names of the Servicers, stock rating agencies, accountants, notaries, legal consultants, and other parties to the securitization, as well as the timing of and fees on the KIK. The
sixth provision also prohibits resale of the ABS to the IM or the
Custodian. The seventh provision requires the ABS to be made
in notarial deed form. The eighth provision states that if the ABS
are privately placed, then the IM has less stringent reporting requirements for disclosure documentation, the KIK, and the ABS
specimen. Finally, the ninth provision provides that every KIK
must be clearly labeled, expressing the names of the KIK, the
ABS, the IM, the classes of securities (whether fixed or floating
cash flow), and the type of underlying assets securing the ABS.
4.3.

Approaches to Practice

4.3.1.

The KIK as the Optimal SPV

Until the enactment of the new law of asset securitization, Indonesian law did not positively sanction the existence of a whollyowned, onshore SPV.162 Decree 53 attempts to remedy this deficiency by creating the KIK which is meant to constitute the SPV.
The KIK serves to unite the IM, the Custodian, and the ABS
holders (the investors), under a common enforceable agreement
160 See id.
161 Although the ABS holders are not in legal privity with the IM and Custodian under the 1IK, the close relationship between the IM and the ABS holders is practically reminiscent of the relationship between the bondholder and
the trustee in the Indonesian bond issuance structure. See July 12 Interview,
supra note 30.
162

See Asmarani, supra note 30, at 12.
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under whose terms the IM and the Custodian each have duties
running to the stakeholders. Decree 53 charges the Custodian to
hold all of the assets under its name although the Custodian cannot recognize these assets in its financial books. Although government officials have deemed the KIK as ideal for debt claim
securitization,163 legal experts view the KIK as possessing hybrid
characteristics of a pass-though equity structure and a pay-through
debt structure.' The KIK is equity-like (pass-through) in that the
stakeholders, i.e., the investors, each are entitled to a prescribed
share of the pool of ABS proceeds. The KIK is debt-like (paythrough) in that stakeholders, i.e., investors, have a claim on the
interest and principal of the ABS issued by the KIK, although the
stakeholders do not own the pool. The Custodian has custody
over the pool. Stakeholders always earn a fixed or floating cash
flow that is pre-arranged, unlike the equity structure where the
cash flow is uncertain.
The KIK represents an untested legal structure. BAPEPAM
chose to endorse this new SPV creature of law known as the Collective Investment Contract instead of refurbishing the current
Indonesian bond offering structure. BAPEPAM was prevented
from sanctioning the familiar bond-offering structure for use as
the onshore SPV because of a quirk in the 1995 Company Law.
This quirk is a provision of the UUPT that disallows the incorporation of a wholly-owned subsidiary for longer than a six-month
duration;165 a wholly-owned SPV is the hallmark of securitization.
It is unclear why BAPEPAM did not openly consult the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") about modifying the relevant article of
the UUPT to allow an exception for a wholly-owned SPV having
the single purpose of onshore asset securitization. If BAPEPAM
and the MOJ had reached an accord on endorsing the existence of
a limited liability company with a single purpose to receive the
assets transferred and make payments on the ABS, then
BAPEPAM would not have been obliged to create this com-

See BAPEPAM to Issue Regulation on Debt Claim Securitization,
ANTA.RA: THE INDONESIAN NAT'L NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 4, 1997, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Indo File.
1" See, e.g., July 12 Interview, supra note 30 (on file with author).
165 "The new UUPT requirements raise the question whether a PT can be a
wholly-owned subsidiary of another PT. The answer appears to be no."
Tabalujan, supra note 30, at 889.
163
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pletely untested SPV entity known as the Collective Investment
Contract.
Nevertheless, the KIK is superior to the Indonesian bond issuance structure insofar as the KIK is not owned by any party related to the Originator. Under the alternative bond-offering
structure, the SPV would have been owned by a subsidiary related
in some way to the Originator, which leaves room for relatively
greater uncertainty in the case of bankruptcy. In the alternative,
this bankruptcy-remoteness problem might have been obviated by
pledging the assets to a trustee who would take effective control
of the SPV. In this alternative SPV structure, the shareholders of
the SPV must pledge in the shares agreement not to take any actions to overrule the trustee and, in a separate undertaking, they
must pledge not to act on the SPV without prior approval of the
trustee. Given the pledges of the SPV owner and the trustee, the
SPV would be unable to incur any liability attacking the sanctity
of the pledged assets. However, BAPEPAM elected not to sanction this convoluted structure in favor of the KIK.
4.3.2.

Taxation

Offshore asset securitization means that the Originator has
placed the SPV somewhere other than Indonesia. Usually the
Indonesian originator chooses to create the SPV in the Netherlands for tax reasons.'66 Taxation of an offshore ABS takes the
following form: an Indonesian originator assigns or sells the cashflow assets to a trustee or fiscal agent offshore, and Indonesian income tax applies to this transaction."' None of the subsequent
transactions carried out offshore, including payment of interest by
the SPV to offshore investors, lending of money to the Indonesian
originator by the SPV, or payment of interest from the Indonesian originator to the SPV, are taxable events in Indonesia.'68
However, the Indonesian originator must pay a ten percent withholding tax for the payment of interest to the SPV on the loan
transaction. Therefore, the offshore transaction faces two taxes:
A decision in May 1997 by the Dutch Supreme Court held that parties
have the freedom to determine choice of law in the assignment of receivables (as
with an SPV), increasing the attractiveness of the Netherlands on a second basis. For more about the case, see The Netherlands Gives Securitizationa Double
Boost, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 47, 47 (Sept. 1997).
167 July 12 Interview, supra note 30.
166

168

See id.
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the income tax from the sale of assets which can never be avoided,
and the ten percent withholding tax. 9
In contrast, the onshore transaction involves higher taxes with
greater uncertainty. Income tax applies to the issuance and purchase of the ABS if the securities are issued at a discount.7
Fifteen percent taxes are charged on the payment of interest to
domestic investors. Ten to twenty percent withholding tax rate
applies depending on the tax treaty on the payment of interest to
foreign investors.171 BAPEPAM wants to mitigate uncertainty by
applying a uniform, favorable tax rate to both domestic and foreign investors. To this end, BAPEPAM is lobbying tax officials
to issue new rules about asset securitization taxation."7
4.3.3.

True Sale

Another basic question is whether the Indonesian legal system
will allow for the transfer of title to receivables. It is unclear what
the legal criteria are for determining whether a true sale has occurred. A common concern about Indonesian transactions is that
the judiciary is not as efficient as it could be. This is especially
important in connection with the enforcement of security interests and bankruptcy proceedings because these actions require recourse to courts.
Indonesian law does not recognize equitable assignments, although it does recognize the effectiveness between an assignor and
an assignee of debt where no notice is given to the underlying account-debtor.'
Under paragraph 2 of Article 613 of the Indone-

sian Civil Code, an account-debtor will be bound to an assignment only if the account-debtor is notified by a court server or
acknowledges and agrees to the assignment in writing.
4.3.4.

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy remoteness under the KIK represents a key area of
uncertainty in the new law. The IM need not be bankruptcy remote because it does not hold the assets, rather, it oversees their

169 See id.
170

See id.

17 See id.
172

See id.

17

See Kruger & Woodhall, supra note 21.
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maintenance." Because the Custodian holds the cash-flow assets
being securitized in custody, its role is vital.175 Decrees 47 and 53
provide that the assets are not the property of the Custodian and
if the Custodian becomes bankrupt, then the assets are legally untouchable by the Custodian's creditors. The old Bankruptcy Law
suggests that once a bank is liquidated, it will take a great deal of
time to recover the underlying assets because the bank is not
obliged to settle accounts quickly.176 The Indonesian legal system
has not had much experience implementing the old Bankruptcy
Law during the last twenty years, so very few bankruptcy cases
are on the books.177
In response to the impact of the Asian financial crisis and pursuant to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy executed with the International Monetary Fund, the government of
Indonesia enacted the Government Regulation in lieu of Law No.
1 of 1998 as an Amendment to the Bankruptcy Law, popularly
called the "New Bankruptcy Law." The New Bankruptcy Law
amends certain provisions of the old law with the aim to make
the law more user-friendly.1 78 Under the New Bankruptcy Law, a
bankruptcy petition in connection with a bank may only be submitted by Bank Indonesia, the central bank of Indonesia. 7'
Therefore, the bankruptcy remoteness of the Custodian will

See discussion supra Section 4.2.1.
See discussion supra Section 4.2.2.
176 See generally Robert N. Hornick, Indonesian Bankruptcy Law Protects
Creditors,INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1998, at 24 (discussing the Bankruptcy Act
of 1906 whose purpose is to promote fair treatment of creditors).
" See id. There is the additional sentiment that Indonesia's bankruptcy code, which dates back to Dutch rule, is largely unenforceable
due to corruption in the judiciary system. Under reforms outlined by
the International Monetary Fund, a new bankruptcy code is set to be
enacted in late July [1998], but many investors remain unconvinced
that the judiciary will demonstrate objectivity in its enforcement.
Bruce Minnigh, Fledgling Market Develops, INT'L FIN. REV. RESTRUCTURING
174

175

ASIA REP. (1998).
178 For a good introduction to the pros and cons of the New Bankruptcy
Law, see Frank Taira Supit, Indonesia's Phoenix, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 9,
1998, at 26.
"" Interview with Ibrahim S. Assegaf, Attorney at Hadiputranto Hadinoto
& Partners (uly 17, 1998) Jakarta, Indonesia).
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probably be enhanced because Bank Indonesia will likely want to
maintain the legitimacy of banks as custodians.18
5. CONCLUSION

The new law of asset securitization marks a step in the development of the Indonesian capital market. The new law authorizes a method for domestic asset securitization transactions where
no method previously existed. The five decrees reflect the Indonesian government's desire and commitment to bringing the
overall commercial and financial legal system of Indonesia in line
with international norms.
Experiences of the late 1970s and the 1980s in the U.S. suggest
that the introduction of securitization into a capital market garners favorable economic results if several conditions are met. The
American experience reflects a shortage of funds due to the withdrawal of traditional lenders, a desire by investors for high yields
on rated investments, and healthy spreads for securities firms.181
All of these conditions exist to varying degrees in Indonesia."' If
Indonesian lawmakers are willing to tweak reforms to accommodate quickly revamped methods- as American lawmakers
were- then doing so may accelerate the process of integrating asset securitization
into the Indonesian capital market main183
stream.
The global market should encourage the embrace of domesticized asset securitization in Indonesia because this method of financing will generate both greater liquidity and greater legal certainty in Indonesia. 84 Indonesian authorities have stated their
belief that the creation of a domestic ABS market will help the
growth of institutional investing in Indonesia, as it did in the
United States.18 Capital market supply side conditions are much
worse off in Indonesia as a result of the Asian financial crisis and

The New Bankruptcy Law additionally provides for a stay prior to the
bankruptcy deliberation which makes the Custodian 'more bankruptcy remote'
than under the old law. July 12 Interview, supra note 30.
180

181 See

Kravitt, supra note 62, at 2.
See DCR Downgrades Bank Internasional Indonesia and P. T BI Trust
Certificates,supra note 54.
182

184

See id.
The same may be said about the New Bankruptcy Law of Indonesia.

18

See discussion supra Section 1.2.

183
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8 6 than what was prevalent
the subsequent reformasi movement"
during the advent of asset securitization in the U.S. in the 1980s.
Nor does Indonesia demonstrate favorable investor-side conditions in view of the financial crisis of late 1997 and 1998.187 As a
basic matter, Indonesian citizens have not thus far shifted their
savings methods to managed funds. Hence, the few domestic investment managers who operate in Indonesia at this point lack the
pools of capital necessary to be able to reach a critical mass of liquidity in the primary and secondary ABS markets.
Although Indonesian authorities have endorsed a method for
onshore asset securitization, the question lingers as to whether
unforeseeable problems in marketing this form of financing transaction loom in the long term. France modified its laws to allow
for the creation of the Fonds Communs de Creances ("FCC"),
which is an SPV tailored to conform to French civil law; nevertheless, the remaining differences between the FCC and the traditional Anglo-American SPV were enough to cause lawyers, rating
agencies, and investors in foreign jurisdictions to balk at embracing this French financial instrument.188 It remains to be seen
whether the civil law analogy between the French FCC and the
Indonesian KIK will give rise to analogous difficulties.
Before the creation of new law concerning asset securitization,
when the civil law scheme had not yet endorsed a domestic
method, Indonesian entities interested in asset securitization had
to take their transactions offshore. The new law, therefore, constitutes a new financial method introduced in Indonesia. This
Comment deems it "a method in madness" because the new law a
priori bespeaks legal and functional uncertainty. The second reason that the new law is deemed "a method in madness" is because
the new law took effect during the height of the recent Asian financial crisis, when Indonesian officials unfoundedly concluded
that the new law might jump-start the capital market, thereby inviting domestic securitization and attracting foreign investors. In
the midst of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesian officials viewed
the new law as a prospective cure for their liquidity crunch, but
domestic securitization has proven to be a non-starter. In the
course of the financial crisis, Indonesian officials viewed the new

See discussion supra note 6.
See generally Kravitt, supra note 62, at 2-3 (discussing the breeding
ground for asset securitization in the United States).
186
187
18

See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 44.
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law as a prospective cure for their liquidity crunch." 9 Perhaps the
most important reason this Comment calls the new law "a
method in madness" derives from the deficiencies of the five decrees. The new law does not fit neatly in accordance with the existing UUPM.
It is uncertain whether the KIK is more like a common law
trust or a civil law entity. Both civil and common law principles
appear in the Five Decrees regarding asset securitization just as
they appear in the 1995 Law Concerning the Capital Market,
which is the enabling statute empowering assett securitization."90
The most pressing shortcoming of the new law is that it fails to
correct uncertainties in Indonesian law, especially the Indonesian
government had been pushing for onshore securitization to ameliorate the financial crisis domestically. For example, no one
knows for sure what will happen to the assets if the Custodian enters bankruptcy. Also, given the lack of legal precedent and resulting unpredictability of the Indonesian judiciary, no one can
predict what will happen to the Investment Manager should it
breach its fiduciary duties. Will BAPEPAM guard the integrity
of the capital market with the most watchful of eyes? In financial
times better than what this Comment now finds, one might argue
that the new law of asset securitization represents landmark legislation on the cutting edge of capital market rulemaking. 9 ' Only
time will tell.

See, e.g., Outlook '98, supra note 31.
"[T]he UUPT appears to be a unique legislative mix of civil and common law concepts." Tabkujan, supra note 30, at 908.
191 The New Company Law has been characterized by one commentator as
"a landmark legislation in the Indonesian corporate scene." Tabalujan, supra
note 30, at 907.
189
192
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